SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Deutsches Zentrum für Luft-und Raumfahrt (DLR) have been working together to create the Stratospheric Observatory For Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA).
The design and modifications have progressed to the point that SOFIA will begin its development-phase flight tests in 2006. This paper shows the rationale for the SOFIA program's decision to not require a crew escape system during the development-phase flight tests.
The dominant risk during the flight test phase is stall testing that has to be performed to meet NASA airworthiness and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification requirements. The assessment showed that under a loss of control/loss of aircraft scenario during a stall test, the aircraft is unlikely to remain stable enough to allow existing crew escape systems to be effective. Similar examination of all other major risks showed that, apart from fire risks, potential crew escape systems are unlikely to be effective. Fire risks have been adequately mitigated by other means. In summary, current qualitative and quantitative safety analyses provided support for SOFIA's program position that SOFIA does not require a crew escape capability during the development-phase flight tests.
INTRODUCTION
SOFIA is a Boeing 747SP (Special Performance) aircraft ( Figure 1 ) extensively modified to accommodate a 2.5 meter reflecting telescope and airborne mission control system. When completed, SOFIA will be the largest airborne observatory in the world. It will provide astronomers access to the entire mid-infrared and far-infrared wavelength range, most of which is otherwise inaccessible from the ground. The observatory is being developed for NASA by a team of industry experts led by the Universities Space Research Association.
The aircraft modification and systems integration effort is being performed by L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, Waco, Texas (Ref. 1).
SOFIA will have a FAA Supplemental Type Certificate and NASA System Safety and airworthiness approvals for science operations. As background, the SOFIA program office did not envision a requirement for a crew escape system beyond that of the existing Boeing 747SP during the program formulation phase. The SOFIA program has an active risk management process that has been tracking all types of risks, including safety hazards that could compromise the aircraft and/or the crew. Along with the design and development work, the safety analyses have also matured. The SOFIA safety analyses include engineering analyses, hazard reports, failure modes, effects and criticality analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, fault tree assessments, and expert system reviews. SOFIA is expected to begin its development-phase flight tests in 2006. During this series of flight tests SOFIA will be verifying the boundaries of the modified aircraft flight envelope; there are inherently larger risks during these flights than in the operational-phase flights. Having defined the flight test program including associated risks, it was an appropriate time for the SOFIA program to revisit the crew escape issue, and address whether a crew escape system is required for the development-phase flight tests. A review of the published literature did not show any existing methodologies for a crew escape decision. This paper describes the steps and rationale enabling SOFIA to reach a decision regarding this issue.
The first part of the methodology focuses on developing a program acceptable risk level. The second part of the methodology focuses on the qualitative and quantitative safety analyses to identify all the loss-of-aircraft risks. It then assesses the viability of a crew escape system in reducing these flight test risks, especially with respect to the dominant risks. The crew escape viability is based on existing crew escape systems that can be suitably accommodated on a 747SP within reasonable program resources. The results are then compared to program acceptable risks. 
Acronyms

SOFIA Systems Overview
The SOFIA system consists of the airborne Observatory and a ground-based Science and Mission Operations Center. The observatory consists of the modified aircraft, telescope assembly, mission controls and communications system, and the science instruments. The Science and Mission Operations Center consists of ground facilities and support equipment for the aircraft, mission, and science systems.
The modified 747SP aircraft is a slightly shorter and longer-range version of the basic 747 "classic" airplane. Figure 2 shows a cutaway view through the aircraft. The telescope is located in a cavity in the rear. The telescope cavity is sealed off from the pressurized, warm cabin area in the front by a pressure-bearing bulkhead wall. The bulkhead wall supports all the weight of the telescope. The telescope drive system, counterweights, and the science instrument are located on the cabin side of the telescope and are accessible during flight. When the aircraft is on the ground, access to the cavity and telescope optics is provided through a door in the aft section. This aft section also contains the environmental control system used to precool the telescope prior to each observing flight and to pressurize the cavity with dry nitrogen during warm up after a flight (Ref. A brief description of the various observatory subsystems is provided next (Ref. [4] [5] . The aircraft airframe and structure have been modified significantly, including the fuselage, skin, doors, the bulkheads and the cabin areas. There have been only minimal modifications of the cockpit, wings, and empennage. The telescope cavity has a new door that consists of an upper rigid door, lower flexible door, inflatable seal system, aperture assembly, and a cavity door control system. The engines, generators, auxiliary power unit, landing gear and brakes, and the fuel supply system have not been modified. The remaining aircraft systems have been modified to some extent -new instruments and uninterruptible power supplies have been added; the hydraulic system, flight control cables, electrical cables, and auxiliary power unit ducts have been rerouted; lighting, air handling system, cabin environmental systems, and interior payloads have all been modified; and a new cavity environmental control system has been added.
The telescope assembly is brand new. It consists of the optical assembly that is supported by structural, suspension, and flange assemblies. There are also telescope assembly controllers, associated software, electrical and support subsystems. The mission controls and communications system provides facility control, blind pointing/header turning, science racks and various other support subsystems. The science instrument suite consist of nine elements with different emphasis, which include focal plane assemblies, support electronics, cabling, water vapor monitor, vacuum pump, blower, and cable load alleviator.
Flight Testing
Currently SOFIA is in its development phase -the design, modification, and integration of observatory are being completed. A series of flight tests has been planned to verify that the observatory meets both FAA and NASA airworthiness criteria. Prior to the tests, FAA will issue an Experimental Type Certificate, which covers three basic phases of flighttesting.
In the first phase of flight tests, SOFIA will fly with its telescope cavity door closed. This configuration of SOFIA has the least amount of initial risk in safely conducting all ground and flight operations. The objectives are to complete the functional check flight, the maintenance check, in-flight calibrations of flight test instrumentation, evaluate aircraft performance and handling qualities, demonstrate satisfactory aircraft structural characteristics and aerodynamic impact of the closed telescope cavity door, and to complete all FAArequired maneuvers. During these flights, in-flight data will be obtained to validate analytical models/tools used to design the modified structures and controls and to verify the expected aircraft performance. For the purposes of this risk analysis, the total flight time during the first phase of flight testing is assumed to be 50 hours.
In the second phase of flight tests, SOFIA will fly with its telescope locked in place, but the telescope cavity door will be opened appropriately. The objectives are to evaluate aircraft performance and handling qualities with the door open, demonstrate satisfactory aircraft structural characteristics, and to ensure that the acoustics, pressure, temperature, and vibration in the telescope cavity environment meet the safety and performance requirements.
In the third phase of flight tests, the telescope cavity door system and the telescope assembly will be fully functional. The objective of this series of tests is the observatory science and mission performance testing.
Finally, in the operations phase, SOFIA is expected to 
Crew Escape Requirements
NASA has policies in place to protect the health and safety of humans involved in its various programs. Specifically, NASA has a policy (Ref.
The SOFIA program also does not have any explicit requirements for crew escape system or crew survival probabilities. No crew escape system was originally planned for the SOFIA aircraft. Implicitly, however, the SOFIA program addresses crew survival probabilities because the remaining SOFIA hazards and risks, prior to the first phase of flight tests, will need to be accepted by the program. These hazards and risks are being monitored by the program and risk mitigation is in place to reduce them.
RISK ACCEPTANCE PHILOSOPHY IN SOFIA
Safety is vital to the SOFIA missions. However, there are inherent risks of the observatory that cannot be eliminated. The inherent risks are those of the unmodified aircraft plus any additional risks from the significantly modified aircraft structure and new systems that make up the observatory. NASA is managing these risks by utilizing risk acceptance criteria that are commensurate to the program phase. Risk acceptance will be highest during the first phase of flight testing where unknowns are the greatest, and future program risk is reduced through airworthiness and performance verification flight tests. During the operations phase, when scientists and general public are passengers in SOFIA risk acceptance levels will be nearly comparable to commercial air travel.
Relative Risk
In this paper, the risk to the SOFIA crew is compared to the risks faced by other people in our society in somewhat comparable situations. This way of expressing relative risk is useful to the decision makers in terms of risk communication. The two societal risks, against which the risk to the SOFIA crew is compared, are summarized next.
According to NTSB's accident statistics (Ref. 
SOFIA Acceptable Program Risk
Since SOFIA progresses from a more risky phase to a less risky phase, two relative risks for either end of this spectrum were proposed. The lower risk, comparable with commercial airline flights, would only be applicable during the routine mission operations phase of the SOFIA program. By the time SOFIA reaches its operations phase, the risk of potential hazards from SOFIA modifications will be reduced to a low level by extensive flight testing in the three previous phases of the program.
For the first flight testing phase, it is acceptable for the SOFIA program to accept a higher risk, not all of it due to SOFIA modifications. In the authors' estimate, most of the high risk comes from performing flight tests near the borders of the flight envelope -these tests establish the SOFIA operating envelope during the operations phase. So, for the first flight testing phase the program risk comparison was relative to US Army aviation rates -the total crew risk should be less than the equivalent US Army aviation fatality risk of 1 in 800 for the 50 flight hours.
After examining this aviation risk and some discussion of automobile fatality rates, the SOFIA program accepted a single event crew risk of approximately 1 in 10,000 during first phase of door closed flight tests.
The rationale for choosing a more conservative figure is to account for any differences between actual versus predicted situations. The US Army fatality rate is based on strong statistical evidence; therefore, it is known to be accurate. This is not true for the SOFIA first phase of flight tests. The risk for SOFIA is the result of one or more risk assessments and includes a number of assumptions and judgments. It is, therefore, relatively more uncertain. By choosing a more conservative number, the SOFIA program hopes to envelop the uncertainties in the various risk assessments.
ANALYTIC-DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
The crew escape risk characterization followed the analytic-deliberative process recommended by the National Research Council (Ref. 9) .
The analysis uses the PRA and the Hazard Reports to provide the accident scenarios for crew escape consideration, including the dominant risk accident scenarios. The PRA is a quantitative analytical technique while the Hazard Reports are a qualitative analytical technique. In both of these techniques only the Loss of Aircraft (LOA) was assessed. For the crew escape decision, the LOA probability was assumed to encompass the crew fatality probability. Deliberation was a composite of formal and informal processes that involved collection of all the analyses, communication between multiple stakeholders, and collective consideration of the crew escape decision, coordinated and collated by the authors.
Quantitative Analysis
A limited scope PRA, that had just been completed but was not yet reviewed, quantified some of the major SOFIA closed door flight test risks. This PRA focused only on the incremental risk of the SOFIA modifications to the aircraft, and did not quantify the risk contribution from the unmodified aircraft, for which statistics are available. In addition, since structural analyses and other engineering analyses were better tools for analyzing some of the modification risks, these risks were also not quantified in the PRA. As a result, the PRA not only does not quantify the total risk, it also does not quantify the total incremental risk of the modifications. Despite its limitations, the authors believe that the PRA results capture most of, and the most critical of, the significant-probability "loss of aircraft" accident scenarios.
During the deliberative process, it was recognized that with current state of knowledge, the potential improvement provided by a crew escape system could not be quantified. Instead it was qualitatively decided whether a crew escape system could help alleviate each of the quantified risks. The results are shown in Table 1 . Also shown in the table is our assessment of whether alternate controls could potentially ameliorate that risk.
The dominant risk is from stall testing that is required for airworthiness certification purposes. Apart from the risk of loss of control during a stall test, there also exists a 747-specific risk of high strains in a tail-area bulkhead that may be affected by the SOFIA modifications. All other modification risks are at least two orders of magnitude lower than the SOFIA program accepted single event crew risk. For the dominant risk, a crew escape system could increase the crew survival probabilities by some amount dependent on effectiveness of the crew escape system during a stall test. However, it was the judgment of the deliberative group that the damage that could cause a LOA during stall test will probably result in an unstable aircraft, and the potential crew escape systems are unlikely to be effective for this accident scenario. The SOFIA crew fatality risk with a crew escape would thus remain of the same order of magnitude. 
Qualitative Analysis
In the SOFIA program, hazard reports for the first phase of flight tests have been compiled that are based on Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analyses, Fault and Event Tree Analyses, traditional engineering analyses and expert system reviews, opinions, and experiences. The hazard reports include potential structural hazards and generic aircraft risks such as the loss of control during flight tests. So, unlike the PRA, this qualitative analysis focused on the total risk of the aircraft, the modified systems, and all flight and ground aspects of the first phase testing. Table 2 shows the results of the deliberative process, where the flight hazards were categorized and listed with the potential improvements that a crew escape system could provide. Also listed in the table are our assessment of whether alternate controls could potentially ameliorate that risk.
A viable crew escape system has the potential to increase crew survivability for the dominant risks associated with aircraft fire and structural failures due to flutter divergence. For the former, alternate fire suppression hazard controls are available; for the latter, crew escape effectiveness may be compromised by aircraft attitude/breakup. Note that stall test hazard, unlike in the PRA, is broken up into two hazard reports. Note also the disagreement between the PRA and the hazard report probabilities for in-flight fire. As the design and risk review progresses, the SOFIA program will investigate all such differences. The differences will either be reconciled or, if no reconciliation is possible, the program will accept one of the risk ratings as applicable. Crew escape may also help for about half the non-dominant hazards that have no additional alternate controls -however these risks are less likely
Deliberative Process and Viable Crew Escape Systems
SOFIA will not operate near the limits of the basic 747SP flight envelope. Also, the SOFIA flight test program will be using highly experienced 747 test pilots -one has flown in approximately 2,000 stall tests. He was of the opinion that the risks were far lower than those assessed. The program, with due diligence, continued and finished the crew escape viability analysis.
During the deliberative process it was recognized by all the participants that parachutes with new escape systems and procedures would be the only viable crew escape system for this aircraft. Highly experienced test pilots were of the opinion that parachutes may provide some risk mitigation for stable in-flight emergencies, and that "if the aircraft is stable enough to parachute from, then it is stable enough to land." The program recognized that additional data was required to verify that parachutes could provide risk mitigation for the dominant SOFIA accident scenarios.
